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In this paper I have tried to pursue two related objectives. First, I have tried to gauge the impact of Japanese 
aid  on South and Southeast Asia. My second objective in this paper is to offer an approach to relate 
governance and aid-effectveness that could be applied to the aid and macroeconomic time-series data from 
the region. Using a bounded rationality format presented in a model that allows to progress towards 
optimality over time invites thinking along the lines of inductive learning to improve both governance and 
aid-effectiveness. Although Japan comes out ahead of many western donors, particularly, large ones such 
as the US and UK, there is still much room for improving aid-effectiveness. Both model-based and 
qualitative interview-based investigations in this paper point to  donor and recipient policies that can be 
geared towards improving democratic governance, openness and grassroots empowerment in order to 
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  21.   Introduction: 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the macroeconomic impact of Japanese foreign 
aid on some South and Southeast Asian countries. This will be done not just for the sake 
of understanding the general connection between foreign aid and economic development 
in Southeast Asia, though this is one of the goals. More important, however, is the goal of 
learning something about the donor policies, allocation of aid by the recipient 
governments, and some of the institutional factors, in particular governance, related to the 
macroeconomics of aid so that other recipients can benefit from the experience of the 
South and Southeast Asian economies. The  Southeast Asian economies chosen for this 
purpose are Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (the MIT economies from hereon)
1. The 
MIT economies have been among the most rapidly growing parts of what a widely cited 
World Bank Study has called “the East Asian Miracle”. Until the financial crisis of 1997 
these economies were very much the vanguard of Asia’s economic march to prosperity. 
 
A combination of factors are often cited for explaining the dramatic transformation of the 
“miracle” economies of Asia. These factors include openness to foreign trade, high 
savings rates, stable macroeconomic policies, high literacy rates and favorable 
demographic characteristics. One might also wish to include an institutional structure — 
certainly far from perfect as the financial crises in these countries have shown — which 
was flexible enough to mobilize domestic resources and to utilize available foreign 
resources, including development assistance for promoting economic growth. 
 
The South Asian country experiences on which the paper is also based are India and 
Bangladesh. I will not discuss the cases individually or exhaustively since individual 
country studies exist and are cited in the reference section. My focus will be in describing 
the common model and the methodology on which the interpretation of the governance 




Japan’s role in recent overseas development assistance has been quite significant.   Most 
of the increase in Japanese aid came in late 80’s.Between 1975 and 1989, the amount of 
ODA increased eight-fold in dollar terms. During the 1990s also Japan continued as a 
major donor in spite of domestic economic slowdown. For example, in 1998, Japan’s 
total ODA was still US$ 10.731 billion approximately .In 1999, according to the OECD 
statistics the aid flow from Japan increased to 15.32 billion dollars---an increase of 44 
percent.. At 1998 constant prices this amounted to 13.45 billion dollars---still an increase 
of 26.4 per cent in real terms.
2  
 
In 2002, Japan’s net ODA volume of USD 9.3 billion was still the second largest among 
the DAC countries. In 2001, Japan conceded its status as the largest bilateral donor to the 
                                                 
1 I will not discuss each and every country, however. Individual country 
studies are cited among the references. 
2 OECD(2001): http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/agjpn.htm 
  3United States, a position it had held for a decade. However,  Japan’s ODA/GNP ratio 
turned out to be only 0.23%. The continuing recession  clearly  had a role to play in the 
gradually declining trend of ODA funds. At the 2002 Monterrey Conference, Japan was 
one of the few DAC members which was unable to commit to maintain or increase ODA. 
As the loan repayments from developing countries keep  increasing, Japan’s the ODA 
budget may have to increase in order to retain current levels of net flows 
 
 
Even as the quantitative dominance in aid giving underwent some decline, Japan’s 
development co-operation program has also undergone major reforms and significant 
restructuring. Japan’s  Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter was revised to 
reflect changed domestic and international circumstances. In addition, the legal status of 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was changed in 2003 to make JICA 
more autonomous. The former Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and the 
Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) merged into the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC) in 1999. Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has become 
the de jure co-ordinating body for the diverse implementing institutions of ODA. In the 
international arena, Japan has played a leading role in fostering new initiatives and in 
hosting major conferences on development issues 
 
Much of Japanese aid has historically been directed to Asia
3.  As Yanagihara and Emig 
have pointed out: 
This feature reflects not only geographic proximity, but also close historical, cultural, 
and economic relations, as well as Tokyo’s recognition of Asia as its logical sphere of 
responsibility in global burden-sharing.
4   
Given the importance of Japanese aid overall, but especially in Asia, it is appropriate to 
ask how effective aid has been so far.The purpose of this paper is to examine the question 
of Japanese aid effectiveness in a limited geographical context, namely for parts of South 
and Southeast Asia. Companion papers in the same volume will look at other regions and 
sub-regions within Asia and elsewhere in the world. In this paper, I will review the 
available evidence at the macroeconomic level to ascertain to what extent Japanese aid 
has promoted development-related expenditures and projects in the South and Southeast 
Asian regions. Sections 2 and 3 will be devoted to these tasks. Some specific policy 
questions posed for this project in particular, will  be addressed in section 4.  
  Since  estimating  the  effectiveness of aid is a complex econometric 
exercise when done in a rigorous way, it seems best to motivate the discussion of this 
paper by using a hypothetical example.
5  The example is constructed in two stages. 
                                                 
3 In 1998, Asia received US$5,372.03 millions or slightly more than 50 
per cent of the total aid disbursement by Japan.See Japan’s ODA, Annual 
Report, 1999.http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/d_g2_01.html 
     4 Shafiqul Islam(ed.), Yen for Development, New York, Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 1991. 
5 For econometric work on some countries in these regions see Gang and 
Khan(1991,1992) Khan(1994;1995a,b,c;Khan 1997; forthcoming)and Khan and 
Hoshino(1992). The appendix contains a prototype model that can be used 
for future work in evaluating the effectiveness of Japanese aid. 
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A.  Suppose a country receives one million dollars in foreign aid.  For the 
moment we do not question the source of aid.  All we are concerned about 
is how this aid is to be spent by the government which receives it. 
 
    It might seem straightforward from the official budgetary documents in 
many LDC's that aid is spent for what economists call development expenditures -- for 
roads, education, health and, in some cases, plant and equipment.  However, many 
studies have questioned this assumption.  The type of policymaker becomes important.  A 
developmentalist policymaker may allocate to development expenditures  
  most of the $1 million received, allowance being made for institutional rigidities, 
uncertainty and some human errors.  However, what if the government is merely 
interested in bureaucratic expenditures?  How much of the money will end up in the 
development budget? 
 
  These  questions  point  to  the  need for distinguishing between 
developmental and statist policymakers.  If we think about aid as a contribution to 
revenue in the budget there is in this case an increase of $1 million in revenue.  A fiscally 
conservative policymaker will not necessarily treat this as a windfall.  On the other hand, 
a fiscally liberal (some might say irresponsible) policymaker may see this $1 million as 
net gain on the revenue side.  In this case domestic revenue raising efforts will be 
affected negatively. 
 
B.  We now introduce a further complication.  Aid may be given by bilateral 
or multilateral donors.  In the first case, it may be another government, for 
instance, Japan.  In the latter case, international organizations or a 
consortium of donors may be involved.  The question to ask now is: given 
the type of policymaker, does the source of aid make any difference?   
How might public expenditures and revenues be affected? 
 
    One answer, of course, is that there is no difference.  In this example, let 
us say that $750,000 went to the development expenditures in A above.  It might turn out 
that regardless of the source this is what happens in step B also.  However, this is not the 
only possibility.  Roughly speaking there are two other broad possibilities.  Either 
bilateral aid leads to more development expenditures then does the multilateral aid or 
vice versa. 
 
  It  is  apparent  now  that we need a model that can distinguish both between 
types of policymakers and types of donors.  We also need to do this in an institutional 
setting which is not too unrealistic. In this paper, I do not use such a model formally to 
evaluate aid effectiveness beyond the impact of aid on some crucial macroeconomic 
variables, but the criteria used conform to the general problem of aid-effectiveness from 
the point of view of promoting genuine human development. The appendix to this paper 
does contain a mathematical model formulated with the above requirements in mind in a 
bounded rationality setting. This has been and can be used  further for the purpose of 
econometric assessment of the impact of Japanese( and other donors’) aid. I will mention, 
  5where appropriate, some results from a limited number of countries on which some work 
has been done so far. 
In the next two sections I will briefly discuss the flow of Japanese aid to South and 
Southeast Asia respectively. Section 4 will be devoted to the question of aid effectiveness 
and further policy issues with the summary and conclusions following in section 5. 
Section 6 is an appendix that outlines a mathematical model for analyzing and estimating 
the effects of foreign aid. 
 
2.  Governance and Aid 
 
 
Recent work at the World Bank and else where ( Burnside and Dollar, 2004;    Kaufmann 
et al., 2003 ) has focused on both general policy environment and some specific variables 
such as corruption in determining aid-effectiveness. In general, it seems both 
theoretically plausible and empirically confirmable that a sound policy environment will 
enhance aid-effectiveness. My approach is complementary to the macroeconomic policy 
environment research done in the mainly single equation econometric tradition. I offer a 
simultaneous equations framework within a general optimizing governance framework.
6  
 
The key insight of the existing work is that under a good macropolicy environment, aid 
promotes growth. I extend this to a broader hypothesis that under fiscally responsible 
regimes aid leads to relatively more development  than nondevelopment expenditures. It 
is possible to test this hypothesis by identifying different macroeconomic governance 
regimes. 
The overall framework of bureaucratic decision making  is one of bounded rationality. 
An  important aspect of policy making in the real world is the endemic uncertainty and 
institutional bounds to rational behavior.  Departures from strict neoclassical utility 
maximization leads us to a bounded rationality framework.  In this framework 
development and fiscal targets may not be known with certainty and are the outcomes of 
a complex negotiation process. The limiting case where development and fiscal targets 
may be known with certainty is a special case in our model. There is an optimizing 
process that in this case would coincide with perfect specification of targets and no 
negotiation costs. 
 
    Consider, however, the more general decision-making process of 
boundedly rational policy-makers who consider ex ante in their budgetary planning 
certain indicators of the "proper" level of (planned) expenditures and revenues.  Although 
these levels are treated as targets ex ante the assumption of an asymmetric loss function 
implies that these are not necessarily the utility maximizing values.  In fact, the policy-
makers possess a loss function in which they try to minimize upward and downward 
deviations which are weighted differently.  The indicator levels from which such 
deviations are measured can be thought of as outcomes of bureaucratic negotiations 
within the state and between the recipient and the donors. 
 
                                                 
6 The details of the model are explained in the appendix. 
  6    It is important to use an explicitly asymmetric loss function because 
policy-makers may weigh the overshooting and the undershooting of these indicator 
levels differently.  For some policy-makers the under-achievement of some indicators 
may be more significant than overshooting.  For others the opposite may be the case. 
 
    By this theoretical and modeling strategy, it is possible to estimate the 
marginal impact of aid on budgetary expenditure and revenue categories.  Earlier works 
such as Heller (1975), Mosley, Hudson and Horrell (1989), Gang and Khan (1991), and 
Khan and Hoshino (1992) employed linear-quadratic or quadratic representations of the 
objective function.  But recent work uses an objective function that can have with higher 
degrees of both non-linearity and asymmetry both theoretically and in empirical 
applications. 
 
    A version of the model describes how foreign aid influences the recipient's 
expenditure and revenue-raising behavior.  In meeting pre-assigned values of indicator 
levels of expenditures and receipts the decision-makers respond in a predictable manner 
to any flows of aid from abroad. 
 
    The model takes into account the potential effect of aid on development 
and non-development expenditures.  The former type of expenditures include the public 
sector's contribution to capital formation.  Human as well as non-human capital are 
included.  A third component of development expenditures is the government's 
contribution to social and economic services, e.g. expenditure on health and general 
welfare.  Non-development expenditures are the expenditures on state administration.  
These two types of government expenditures are financed by internal and external means.  
Domestic revenues include taxes, public enterprise surpluses and borrowing.  External 
assistance comes in the form of bilateral and multilateral aid. 
  
    Much of the literature on the macroeconomic effects of foreign assistance 
focuses on aid's effect on economic growth.  My modeling approach is to analyze the 
impact of aid on public sector variables.  Since aid funds pass through policy-maker's 
hand prior to reaching their destination, understanding where these funds are allocated by 
policy-makers is a prerequisite to understanding the long-term effects of aid.  The 
distinction made here is between current development and current non-development 
expenditures.  As a rule, the former will contribute to the long run health of the economy 
while the latter will not.
7 The full model is described in appendix 1. Structural equations 
derived from policy makers’ alternative preferences are also given there. 
 
     The purpose of this model is to determine (a) what effect aid has on the 
development efforts and fiscal behavior of the recipient; and (b) to what extent the type 
                                                 
    7 Obviously, there can be some complementarity between development and 
nondevelopment expenditures.  For example, within provisions of an 
infrastructure, legal and other kinds of services and certain types of 
regulatory environment for "normal" business activities the directly 
productive investment could be very productive. 
  7of donor makes a difference. In determining the effect of aid ([a] above) the type of 
policymaker in the recipient country turns out to be crucial.Some illustrative empirical 
results are described in section 5. 
 
Another way to discuss the relevance of good policies and governance is to 
emphasize that complementarities to foreign aid are crucial for the proper 
utilization of aid. In an earlier study, I emphasized this relation by calling these 
FACE or foreign aid complementarity elements. These elements may indeed turn 
out to be crucial in determining aid-effectiveness. Therefore we need to spell out 
what FACE may entail. 
  First of all we can divide the components of FACE into two further sub-
categories; namely, institutional and policy-induced. Among the former are the 
institutional structures, capacities, and practices at the political-administrative, 
economic and civil society levels. In MIT and the South Asian economies 
generally these institutional aspects were not as strong as in the case of East Asia. 
Yet they were definitely present. The state, while not autonomous, had periods of 
strength. Malaysia had the strongest state capacity. Indonesia and Thailand had 
considerably less capacity. It is not surprising, in retrospect, that  the last two – 
particularly Indonesia – became readily vulnerable to not only financial crisis but 
in social and political crisis as the aftermath of the financial crisis. Although civil 
societies remain weak in the MIT economies, there is a minimal structure of 
indigenous organizations complemented by some NGOs. 
             The contrast with the South Asian economies is also revealing. In the late 
sixties and early seventies most  South Asian economies probably had a relatively 
more effective administrative structure than did the  Southeast Asian economies, 
with the exception of Hong Kong. However, their period of rapid growth and 
modest---with the exception of Singapore--- administrative treforms neatly 
coincided so that the governance factor is more or less equal today. This is far 
from saying that the  South Asian economies and the Southeast Asian economies 
do not need further reforms. Quite the opposite is implied. However, the claim 
that policy-induced reforms are both necessary and ---within limits--- possible, 
gets some support from the historical experience of the Southeast Asian 
economies in particular. 
  Therefore,the second, policy-induced part of FACE is equally important.In 
fact, a broader consideration of policy-induced part of FACE is warranted. 
Policies of export-led development have been significant if not instrumental in 
mobilizing foreign aid for investment purposes. The presence of foreign direct 
investment invited by opening the economy at least partially may also have 
influenced the channeling of aid to investment. Finally, creation of human capital 
through health and education policies also played a role in MIT economies, but 
much less so than in South Asia or even East Asia. Of course, this only under- 




  8The governance element in the macroeconomic context is the stock of institutions 
of governance--- executive, legislative and judiciary---including the crucial 
human and social capital components. The model-based exercise captures the 
quality of governance indirectly via the policy maker type within the state. A 
more direct approach based on direct measures of governance is also possible. 
Hence, my claim that my approach is complementary to the direct approach 
which, however, has not tried to capture the interdependencies among the 
governance and other aspects of aid. At the aggregate macrolevel my approach 
directs attention to these interdependencies in  an optimizing framework that leads 
to a systems approach captured formally in this particular formulation by a set of 
simultaneous equations. 
 
At a more detailed microlevel the quality of specific institutions need to be 
measured. Other than a few comments on the interactions between Japanese aid 
administration and the recipient government officials at various levels based on 
qualitative information gathered through discussions and interviews , I do not 
attempt to discuss these issues here. I now turn to a discussion of Japanese Aid to 





3. Japanese Aid to South Asia: 
According to the Asian Development Bank, the economic region South Asia comprises 
of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Together these 
countries received almost 1.5 billion dollars in 1998. This amounted to about 14 percent 
of the total aid disbursed by Japan for that year. 
There is wide variation in total aid received in absolute terms among the various 
recipients. In 1998,  the range was from  a low of 8.47 million dollars for Bhutan to a 
high of 504.95 million dollars to India. Generally, the size of aid varied consistently and 
almost proportionately with the size of the recipient country’s economy. However, 
Pakistan, which has an economy much smaller than that of India, received almost an 
equal amount of aid in 1998--- 491.54 million dollars. Historically, Pakistan and India 
have been the two largest recipient countries, followed by Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as 
the countries that shared distant 3
rd and 4
th places between them. Small economies such 
as Bhutan or Maldives have historically received smaller amounts, but almost all of the 
aid has been as grants. 
A fraction of Japan’s aid to this region has come as technical cooperation grants. 
However, historically, the amounts have been quite modest. In 1998, for example, the 
total for the region as a whole was only 110.05 million dollars. This amounted to just 
over seven per cent of the total Japanese aid received in the region. Even large countries 
like India and Pakistan consistently received very little in the way of technical 
cooperation grants. For example, India received only 20.51 million dollars or only four 
per cent of the total aid received from Japan, as technical cooperation grants in 1998. 
Bangladesh was the country that received the largest amount in this category; but even so, 
the actual amount was only 22.83 million dollars. 
  9Before discussing the effectiveness of various categories of aid for this region, a 
comparison with Southeast Asia will be useful. It is to this task that I now turn. 
4.  Japanese Aid to Southeast Asia:  
Southeast Asia as a region received more aid than did South Asia in 1998. This also 
confirms a historical trend going back to the 1970s. In 1998, the total Japanese aid for the 
region was 2,437.66 million dollars--- higher by about one billion dollars than the aid 
flow to South Asia during the same year. 
One Southeast Asian country, Indonesia was listed as the top Japanese aid recipient for 
1999 by OECD sources. The total was 1,749 million dollars. Another Southeast Asian 
country, Thailand ranked third after China, with a received aid flow of 953 million 
dollars in 1999. For the same year, Philippines and Viet Nam were the 5
th and 6
th largest 
aid recipients respectively. Finally, another Southeast Asian country, Malaysia took the 
10
th place with 235 million dollars received in 1999. Thus, 5 countries in the region were 
among the top ten recipients of Japanese aid. This region has consistently been the major 
beneficiary from Japanese aid. Other than the entry of PRC in the list of major recipients 
nothing has happened to stem the flow. 
Technical cooperation grants have also been higher for this region than those for South 
Asia. The total amount in 1998 was more than half a billion dollars or over twenty per 
cent of the total. This compares favorably both absolutely and relatively with the 
corresponding figures for South Asia mentioned previously. Even small economies such 
as Laos or Cambodia received technical assistance grants that are comparable to those 
received by large South Asian recipients such as India or Bangladesh. In 1998 Cambodia 
received a total aid flow of 81.4 million dollars of which 23.05 million dollars came as 
technical assistance. For the same year, Laos received 20.9 million dollars in technical 
assistance grants out of a total amount of 85.57 million dollars of Japanese aid to that 
country. 
Larger  recipients like Indonesia and Thailand have routinely received technical 
assistance from Japan between 100 and 200 million dollars a year during the 1990s. For 
example, Indonesia received 203.67 million dollars in 1995. Thailand received 147.46 
million dollars during the same year. Even wealthy countries such as Brunei and 
Singapore received technical assistance grants from Japan in the 1990s, albeit for much 
smaller sums. Among the developing countries in the region only Myanmar received very 
small amount of aid and technical assistance relative to its needs. 
Thus, Southeast Asia, along with China, has been clearly Japan’s favorite region for 
channeling aid flows. Even with the recent changes, it still remains one of Japan’s 
favorite region for aid disbursements.  Therefore, to a large extent, the overall historical 
effectiveness of total aid from Japan depends on whether aid has been effective in 
Southeast Asia. I now turn to an assessment of the effectiveness of Japanese aid. 
 
5.  Effects of Japanese Aid and Some Policy Issues: 
 
 
In the late 1990s Japan announced a new approach to aid management, based on 
transparency and efficiency. Given this basic shift in aid philosophy, it is even more 
important now to assess the impact of the aid carefully. Ideally, a country by country, 
sector by sector and project by project study should be done, based on a uniform 
  10methodology. That ideal is not achievable at present, at least not in this paper. In what 
follows I report in detail the results from the macroeconomic impacts of Japanese vs. 
other donors’ aid in  two  country studies I have done independently--- Bangladesh from 
South Asia and Indonesia from Southeast Asia. I also try to answer as many of the 
following questions related to Japanese aid policy, relying on my formally rigorous 
academic studies, experience as an economist at the Asian Development Bank, and 
consultant to various development organizations and Asian governments. These issues 
are whether Japanese aid 
•  attaches central importance to promoting the self-help efforts of developing countries; 
 
•  focuses on building economic infrastructure; 
 
•  emphasizes technology transfer in technical cooperation; 
 
•  request-based aid procedure ensures non-intervention in domestic political matters; 
 
• ODA schemes and formulas are diverse enough; 
 
•  the decision-making system is overly centralized in Tokyo; 
 




I will also try to ascertain 
 
• the desirability of having Japanese government ministries select technical experts for 
overseas aid assignments; 
 
• the effectiveness of emphasizing on-the-job-training (OJT) in technology transfer 
strategies; 
 
• the degree to which project-based technical assistance is donor driven in the following 
respects: identification; design; implementation and monitoring; and substantive areas of 
assistance; 
 
• the merits and actual policy emphasis on various types of technical cooperation such as 
project vs. program formulas; 
 
• the merits and actual policy emphasis on such efforts as the promotion of technology 
substitution, technology transfer, and institution building; 
 
• the quality and appropriateness of technical experts; 
 
• the quality and appropriateness of training techniques; 
 
  11 
 
The Macroeconomic Impact: development vs. non-development expenditures---
results from an econometric model: 
 
The model is formally set out in the appendix. Roughly, it describes the behavior of 
policymakers given their own type(e.g., whether they are developmentalist or not) and 
determines how much of the aid from various sources goes to either development or non-
development expenditures. There are  eight possible policy maker types depending on  
whether they are statist or not, whether they are developmentalist or not, and whether 
they are fiscally responsible or not. 
 
  The model takes into account the potential effect of aid on development and non-
development expenditures.  The former type of expenditures include the public sector's 
contribution to capital formation.  Human as well as non-human capital are included.  A 
third component of development expenditures is the government's contribution to social 
and  economic services, e.g. expenditure on health and general welfare.  Non-
development expenditures are the expenditures on state administration.  These two types 
of government expenditures are financed by internal and external means.  Domestic 
revenues include taxes, public enterprise surpluses and borrowing.  External assistance 
comes in the form of Japanese bilateral and other aid. 
 
5a: Results from Bangladesh: 
 
For the period, 1980 to 1999, Bangladesh received aid from both Japanese and other 
bilateral and multilateral sources. The model results show that on the whole Japanese 
bilateral aid was somewhat more effective in generating developmental expenditures than 
other aid. 
Indeed, it is striking that for both developmentalist and non-developmentalist types of 
policymakers Japanese bilateral aid seems to have had a greater impact than other aid in 
almost every case of development expenditures.      It is also interesting that in the 
presence of Japanese aid approximately 25 to 31 percent of this aid goes to development 
expenditure on the margin if the policymaker is non-developmental.   On the other hand, 
the corresponding percentage of aid going to development expenditures, if the 
policymaker is developmentalist, is between 51 and 64 percent. Thus, it would be 
appropriate to conclude that in terms of influencing development expenditures in 
Bangladesh, success   for Japanese bilateral aid depends on the type of the policymakers 
in Bangladesh; however, regardless of which type made policy in the last two decades, 
Japanese aid fared better than the non-Japanese aid.   In addition to revealing the 
influence of Japanese aid, the results also indicate that the type of the policymaker really 
can make a difference.   The type of the policymaker also makes a difference in terms of 
financing development expenditures out of domestic revenue.   For a non-developmental 
policymaker, rather dismally, the model implies that between 78 and 85 percent of 
domestic revenues may go to non-development expenditures in the presence of aid in 
Bangladesh development purposes. 
  12    What kind of policymakers did make the decisions in Bangladesh 
regarding development?   This is a particularly fascinating question, but is hard to answer 
in a definitive fashion.  Within the context of the model, the "best guess" one can make 
must use a great deal of reliable institutional history.On the whole, however, a picture of 




    It is also possible to offer some econometric evidence to corroborate the 
above characterization.   Akaike information criterion or   AIC is a model selection 
criterion that can be applied to any model that can be estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method.  One simply minimizes (2LogL)/n + 2k/n where k=the number of 
parameters in the likelihood function L and n is the number of observations.   Particularly 
for a non-linear model the AIC is a convenient econometric discriminator among 
different model specifications.  It would seem that by this criterion, during the period of 
observation  statist concerns dominated the real fiscal agenda in Bangladesh.  This too, 
seems to be consistent with the institutional studies and my own informal observations. 
 
  I f   t h e   presence of aid pulls some money out of the domestic revenue to 
non-development purposes we have to be cautious about its overall effects. Only if the 
substitution effect is not too high (i.e. aid does not replace completely development 
expenditures that would have been financed out of domestic revenues) will there be an 
incremental effect of aid on development expenditures.  Under this scenario also, 
Japanese bilateral aid turned out to be relatively more effective.  
 
 
5b: Results from Indonesia---development  vs. non-development expenditures: 
 
Just like in Bangladesh, it is striking that for both developmentalist and non-
developmentalist types of policymakers, Japanese bilateral aid seems to have had a 
greater impact than the rest of the world aid in on development expenditures types.In the 
presence of Japanese aid, approximately 26 to 39 percent of this aid goes to development 
expenditure on the margin if the policymaker is non-developmental.   On the other hand, 
the corresponding percentage of aid going to development expenditures is between 67 
and 53 percent if the policymaker is developmentalist.    
    What kind of policymakers did make the decisions in Indonesia regarding 
development?   This is a particularly fascinating question, but again is hard to answer in a 
definitive fashion.   The "best guess" one can make must use a great deal of reliable 
institutional history.   In case of Indonesia this is largely unavailable.  The books and 
articles written on this subject deal at best with particular episodes.   On the whole, 
however, again, like Bangladesh, a picture of at least partial commitment to genuine 
development objective emerges.   This is also consistent with my own visits to Indonesia 
                                                 
8  This is also consistent with my own visits to Bangladesh and extensive conversations with the 
Bangladeshi and other academics and development practitioners on the subject. Since I speak 
and read Bengali, it was easy for me to meet and talk with people from many different 
backgrounds. 
  13and extensive investigations with the Indonesian and non-Indonesian academics and 
development practitioners on the subject. 
  
    As in the case of Bangladesh, here too,I am also able to offer some 
econometric evidence to corroborate the above characterization.   It would seem that by 
the previously mentioned Akaike information criterion at least,  in Indonesia  both 
developmental and statist concerns dominated the real fiscal agenda during this period.  
This too, seems to be consistent with the institutional studies and my own informal 
observations. 
 
5c: Some Institutional and Policy Issues: 
 
Turning now to the questions raised at the beginning of this section, it is clear in light of 
the above, that rigorous answers would require further data gathering and econometric 
estimation. For example, TAs could be distinguished from other forms of Japanese aid 
for model formulation and estimation. In fact, this looms as a major future task. For the 
moment, one has to rely on institutional knowledge and expert opinion to address the 
questions raised earlier. 
As far as promoting self-reliance is concerned, the results, as perceived by the 
policymakers in these two regions, seems to have been mixed.On the one hand, some 
technical projects, such as the capability for Input-Output matrix data generating for the 
BPS(Biro Pusat Statistik), Indonesian central statistical Bureau that was aided by IDE has 
been a success. On the other hand Indonesian experts express some misgivings about 
large scale, especially,  infrastructural projects where technological learning may not be 
taking place rapidly enough. 
Thus, while emphasis on infrastructural projects may be correct at the present stage of 
development in South and Southeast Asia, the transfer of technology and skills could be 
speeded up. Training of local personnel and use of local businesses and professionals 
whenever available will be an appropriate policy move.  
As far as intervention in domestic policy formulation of the recipients and their domestic 
politics are concerned the Asian policymakers generally compare Japan favorably to the 
US. In their view, the US has a history of using aid for political purposes, whereas Japan 
uses it for economic and, increasingly in recent years, for humanitarian purposes. At the 
same time, smaller European countries such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian 
countries are perceived as being the most fair donors. 
In terms of diversity of aid schemes and formulas, the recipients express a perception of  
lack of transparency on the part of Japanese government. In Bangladesh, several NGO 
representatives expressed a desire to see greater allocation and  involvement of Japanese 
aid to health, education and gender-related projects. Health-oriented efforts such as the 
Shapla Neer are greatly valued and appreciated. Environment is another area where there 
is a perceived need for greater funding than is currently the case. 
The remarks heard about the lack of transparency also are echoed when the centralization 
of Japanese aid decision making procedure in Tokyo is mentioned. However, many South 
and Southeast Asian policymakers think that the other donors are also centralized and 
hamstrung by an aid bureaucracy that is largely unaware of recipient needs and unwilling 
to listen. 
  14I will now also try to ascertain the following based on qualitative information gathered 
through discussions and interviews: 
 
• the desirability of having Japanese government ministries select technical experts for 
overseas aid assignments; 
 
• the effectiveness of emphasizing on-the-job-training (OJT) in technology transfer 
strategies; 
 
• the degree to which project-based technical assistance is donor driven in the following 
respects: identification; design; implementation and monitoring; and substantive areas of 
assistance; 
 
• the merits and actual policy emphasis on various types of technical cooperation such as 
project vs. program formulas; 
 
• the merits and actual policy emphasis on such efforts as the promotion of technology 
substitution, technology transfer, and institution building; 
 
• the quality and appropriateness of technical experts; 
 
• the quality and appropriateness of training techniques 
 
On all of the above issues there is a surprising amount of unanimity among the 
Bangladeshi and Indonesian policymakers and other aid constituencies. In particular, they 
all agree that much of Japanese aid is donor- driven , beginning with identification of 
projects and programs.  In their view, the design, implementation and monitoring are also 
one-sided. 
In terms of the quality and appropriateness of technical experts, these show wide 
variations. Over time, the quality has improved. Also, as Japanese universities and 
training institutes pay more attention to the training of development professionals and 
devise improved curricula, the sought-after quality-improvement seems to be taking place. 
Young Japanese who learn Asian languages and culture seem to be better appreciated and 
are probably more effective actually than are those with simply advanced academic 
training from western institutions without the cultural assets. While it is desirable to have 
these Japanese experts who have the requisite technical skills and cultural sensitivities, a 
sense of partnership with the local experts seems to be missing. The ideal should, 
therefore, be a mix of rigorous technical training and cross-cultural sensitivity geared 
towards building a permanent partnership in development. 
 
Finally, I want to discuss  the merits and actual policy emphasis on such efforts as the 
promotion of technology substitution, technology transfer, and institution building. Here, 
neither Japan nor any other donor gets high marks. At the same time, my own views, 
based on discussions in Asia, are that Japan, in spite of  a history of aggression in 
Southeast Asia, is perceived as potentially more capable of accomplishing these goals 
than are the other donors. In South Asia, particularly, India and Bangladesh, there is 
  15much goodwill among the policy elite and at the popular level for Japan. Although the 
political history is complex, there is a positive historical memory also based on such facts 
as the acknowledgement that  Subhash Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army were 
supported by Japan in their sincere and self-sacrificing revolutionary war for 
independence against British imperialism. However, there is still a perception in China in 
particular that the Japanese government has not dealt with the war crimes in a satisfactory 
fashion; but this does not seem to be as sharply felt or as tenaciously held in Southeast 
Asia. 
  Culturally also, the links through Buddhism and other elements still find a warm echo in 
the hearts of the people in both South and Southeast Asia even after so many centuries. If 
Japan shows sincere commitment to transfer technology, help build institutions of 
popular participation, and a genuine interest in transferring skills in a credible way, it can 
easily establish itself as the most helpful donor in South and Southeast Asia. Moving in 
this direction indeed will be the more general move towards optimality as distinguished 
from the technical discussion and the formal move towards optimality within the bounded 
rationality model in the appendix. 
 
6.  Conclusions: 
 
In this paper I have tried to pursue two related objectives: 
 
First, I have tried to gauge the impact of Japanese aid  on South and Southeast Asia. 
Clearly, Japan comes out ahead of many western donors, particularly, large ones such as 
the US and UK. However, other smaller western donors are also looked at favorably by 
the recipients. But in all cases, there seems to be a perception that local voices are not 
being heard and that the manner of giving aid is more of a bureaucracy to bureaucracy 
than people to people. Better training of technical personnel, more knowledge of the 
history, geography and cultures of the recipients will be helpful. Language training 
should also be an integral part of this. There is a widespread perception that in its bid to 
catch up with the west Japan lost its interest in the rest of Asia and its own deep cultural 
bonds. A refocusing on Asia in a deeper way may help Japan regain its own cultural 
balance as well. 
Another problem for Japan to avoid is to look too insistently on its own economic history 
to find policies for other Asian countries. As my Japanese colleagues, K. Ohno and K. 
Sakurai have pointed out: 
The conditions of Japan in those days and those facing the developing countries 
and the transitional economies today are different. If the conditions are different, 
the policies  and directions that need to be pursued are not necessarily equivalent. 
These conditions not only include economic aspects, such as the international 
setting, developmental stage, levels of capital and labour force, human capacity 
and population, administrative capacity of the government, but also historical, 
cultural, social, and geographical conditions.
9
 
                                                 
9 Higashi Ajia no Kaihatsu Keizaigaku, translation by OECD, OECD(1999) 
p.23. See also the book by Ohno and Ohno and the contributions therein. 
  16It is to be hoped that by listening to such sage advice from within and outside Japan, and 
using its own historical experience as a partial guideline Japanese aid policy in the future 
will be guided more fully by both impartial economic analysis and a political and cultural  
dialogue between Japan on the one hand and, South and Southeast Asia on the other. 
 
My second objective in this paper was to offer an approach to relate governance and aid-
effectveness that could be applied to the above data. 
 
In terms of answering the specific social scientific question regarding the relationship 
between governance and aid-effectiveness, the sum total of empirical findings point to 
several interesting directions. In addition to offering a new indirect but comprehensive 
economic model, the econometric results raise some deeper issues related to governance. 
 
First, the general position that good governance can benefit the recipients by making aid 
more effective receives some indirect support. The developmentally oriented and fiscally 
responsible governance seems to lead to relatively more development expenditures and 
stronger revenue- raising efforts in general. 
 
Second, and even more interesting finding is that even in a weak governance environment 
Japanese aid has been more effective than most other donors. This requires a detailed 
investigation in terms of the types of projects and the modalities of Japanese aid. This 
area emerges as a high priority research area for donors and recipients alike who are 
interested in both the longer-term goal of improving governance  and the shorter-term 
objective of getting the most out of aid even under suboptimal governance. 
 
Third, the bounded rationality format invites thinking along the lines of inductive 
learning to improve both governance and aid-effectiveness. For example, a neural 
network approach where learning from both past successes and failures can take place is 
a possible framework for investigating the hypothesis that such inductive learning can in 
fact improve both governance and aid-effectiveness.
10
 
Most importantly, from the point of view of both the political and social
11 economic 
analysis of Japanese aid in these regions, a nonbureaucratic, people to people dialogue 
and better coordination of governmental and nongovernmental actors on both the 
Japanese and the recipients’ sides will offer large payoffs. For both Japan and the 
recipient governments commitment to such democratizing of the aid process and 
particularly the implementation and monitoring phases will lead to increasing aid 
effectiveness and genuine human development. 
 
6. Appendix: A Bounded Rationality Model for Econometric Estimation of the 
Impact of Japanese and other Aid: 
 
                                                 
10 For an example of this approach in the context of banks the 
interested reader can see chapters 7 and 8 of Khan(2004)Global Markets 
and Financial Crises in Asia. 
11 Pernaps, even more broadly, ‘cultural economic’ aspects also. 
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The Asymmetric Loss function Model for Allocation of Foreign Aid : 
 
    The policy-makers minimize a loss function subject to expenditure 
constraints.  In most general terms, the (quadratic-ratio) loss function, L, is given by 
 




  if j = *, then i
k = i, 
  if k = *, then i
j = i, 
  i = R, D, N, 
  β ≥  2 .           ( 1 )  
 
 
"j" and "k" are related in the following way: if j (respectively k) represents the indicator 
value (symbolized by *) then i
k (respectively, i
j) equals i.  "i" and "j" can be R, D, or N 
(domestic revenues, development expenditures and nondevelopment expenditure, 
respectively).  The simplest non-linear model which is also asymmetric and economically 
meaningful, is obtained when β = 2.  Note that for exact fulfillment of chosen indicator 
levels, L = α0 + (αR/2) + (αD/2) + (αN/2).  The policy-maker is making decisions on 
various categories of public expenditures.  Each decision will reflect on her abilities, 
possibly her status, or even her job.  In an uncertain environment, the best she can do is to 
reach the stated chosen indicator value. 
 
    The loss function stated in equation (1) has the advantage of allowing for 
asymmetries in loss when the policy-maker over- or undershoots the chosen indicator 
level.  It also allows us to examine different assumptions about the "type" of the policy-
maker.  For example, writing the loss function explicitly as  
 
  α0 + (αD/2)(D*/D)
2 + (αN/2)(N/N*)
2 + (αR/2)(R/R*)
2                          (2)              
 
illustrates a policy-maker who is "developmentalist" in orientation:  undershooting the 
development expenditure indicator value is worse than overshooting it.  At the same time, 
the above policy-maker is a "fiscal liberal" since overshooting the revenue raising 
indicator value is worse then undershooting.  Such policy-makers are not very anxious 
about the emergence of the inflationary gap. These bureaucrats are also "non-statist" in 
that overshooting nondevelopment expenditures is worse than undershooting.  Statist 
bureaucrats who seek to maximize the resources which the state uses to reproduce itself 
would have loss functions that are asymmetric in exactly the opposite direction with 
regard to the composition of public expenditure.  All in all, there are eight possible 
characterizations. Part of our problem is to explore which of these characterizations 
captures the behavior of policy-makers "best" in an empirical setting. 
 
    Given the type of policy-maker, the decision making problem can be 
described as the minimization of a specific form of equation (1).  The economic and 
institutional constraint to which this minimization problem is subjected is the following: 
 
  18    N + D = R + AB + AM 
 
The above, of course, is the accounting identity that expenditures equal receipts.  To 
capture the distribution of foreign aid and domestic revenues into budgetary categories 
we instead write, 
 




 N  =  ρRR + ρBAB + ρMAM      ( 4 )  
 
(1 - ρR), (1 - ρB), and (1 - ρ B
                                                
M) are the fractions of domestically raised revenues, bilateral 
aid and multilateral aid, respectively, allocated to government development expenditures.  
These two constraints reflect alternative uses of government revenues augmented by 
foreign assistance.   The first constraint allows for the possibility that D can be financed 
partly by domestic revenues and partly by different sources of foreign aid.  The second 
constraint assumes that domestically raised revenues, and foreign aid not used for 
development purposes, go towards nondevelopment government expenditure.  The model 
thus involves a trade-off between development and other spending by the government.  It 
is a theoretical model of the implications of recipient preferences that can be used to 
determine the fiscal behavior of the government in the presence of foreign aid. 
12
    Solving the constrained loss minimization problem leads to a set of 
nonlinear simultaneous equations.  The direction and extent of the impact of bilateral and 





     12 One would like the allocation of aid among budgetary categories to 
be the outcome of a utility maximizing problem.  Incorporating 
fungibility into a decision-making problem as a subproblem is extremely 
difficult.  Use of a single budgetary constraint a priori assumes that 
aid is 100 percent fungible.  While not directly addressing the 
fungibility issue, our approach does not a priori assume 100 percent 
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